We study the long run (low frequency) dynamic relationship between money, as measured by inflation or interest rates, and unemployment. We first develop a framework where money and unemployment are both modeled with microfoundations based on explicit frictions. This integrates and extends recent work in macro-labor economics along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides and in monetary theory along the lines of Lagos and Wright, and provides a unified model for the analysis of unemployment and inflation. We discuss optimal fiscal and monetary policy. We then calibrate the model and discuss the extent to which it can account for salient aspects of the data. Using Shimer's calibration method for labor market parameters, low frequency changes in inflation account for very little of the changes in unemployment over the last 50 years; using Hagedorn and Manovskii's method, changes in inflation account for most of the low frequency movement in unemployment.
Introduction
We study the dynamic relationship between money, as measured by inflation or interest rates, and unemployment. While this relationship is a central policy concern and classic topic for macroeconomic analysis, we take a different approach than most previous studies, by focusing on the long run or low frequency movements in the variable, in the sense that we abstract from imperfect information (including real-nominal signal-extraction problems) and rigidities (including sticky prices). As Friedman (1977) described things, "There is a natural rate of unemployment at any time determined by real factors. This natural rate will tend to be attained when expectations are on average realized. The same real situation is consistent with any absolute level of prices or of price change, provided allowance is made for the effect of price change on the real cost of holding money balances." The goal here is to take seriously the notion that allowance really must be made for "the effect of price change on the real cost of holding money balances."
Obviously, to understand the joint dynamics of these variables it is be good to have a theory where unemployment, inflation, and the interactions between them are modeled carefully. In recent years much progress has been made studying unemployment and inflation using theories that explicitly explicitly incorporate frictions -in the former case, search and matching frictions, and in the latter case, some sort of double problem combined with anonymity.
1 It is not surprising that models with frictions are useful for understanding dynamic labor markets and hence unemployment, as well as for understanding the role of money 1 In terms of unemployment, we have in mind models of the labor market along the lines of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) , but also going back to work by Diamond (1982) , Mortensen (1982) , and Pissarides (1990) , and continuing with recent contributions by Shimer (2005) , Hall (2005) , Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) and others. In terms of money and inflation, we have in mind models along the lines of Lagos and Wright (2005) , but also going back to work by Kiyoatki and Wright (1989,1993) , Shi (1995 Shi ( ,1997 Trejos and Wright (1995) , Kochelakota (1998) , Wallace (2001) and many others. and hence inflation. However, existing models along these lines analyze either unemployment or inflation in isolation. We develop a framework that integrates and extends these theories, which allows us to analyze unemployment and money together in a model with relatively explicit microfoundations for both.
We think one can learn a lot by extending labor market models to include the exchange of commodities, even without money playing an explicit role, but perhaps especially when money does play such a role (in the standard model, when a worker and firm match they simply eat the output; there is no exchange). Similarly, one can learn a lot by extending monetary theory to have more interesting labor markets. To give just one example of the way the unified model teaches us something that may not be easy to see from either literature separately, we show how optimal monetary policy depends on labor market institutions. Thus, e.g., if unemployment insurance is too low, for whatever reason, inflation in excess of the Friedman rule is optimal, although if we can choose both fiscal and monetary policy without constraints, the Friedman rule is optimal and labor market policy should be set in accordance with the usual criteria.
The framework is amenable to quantitative analysis. As an example, we discuss the extent to which it accounts for salient aspects of inflation, unemployment, interest rates, and velocity over the last half century. Since we want the model to address medium-to long-term observations -as we said, in this paper, we abstract from imperfect information, price stickiness, and other features that may be important at higher frequencies -we focus on the HodrickPrescott trends in the data. We first document that in the long run there is a clear positive relation between inflation and unemployment (an upward sloping Phillips curve) and between velocity and interest rates (a downward sloping money demand curve). The model generates both of these qualitative features for natural reasons: higher inflation or nominal interest rates constitute a higher tax on money holdings, which in equilibrium reduces real balances, which hurts profit in the goods (retail) market, which discourages entry and job creation; this raises unemployment.
To see how big the effects are, the model is calibrated using methods and observations and that are fairly uncontroversial, with the exception of one wellknown issue: pinning down the value of leisure. Shimer (2005) proposes a stratgey that implies the standard model matches steady states but cannot explain cyclical behavior; Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) propose an alternative method to match steady states that allows the model to match cyclical behavior very well. We report results for both. The Shimer method implies a nearly vertical long-run Phillips curve; the Hagedorn and Manovskii method implies an elasticity of unemployment with respect to inflation very much consistent with the data -that is, low frequency changes in inflation can account for almost all of the low frequency movement in unemployment. Hence, the response of unemployment to monetary policy hinges on the same issues as the response of unemployment to technology shocks. What is not sensitive to this calibration issue is the following: a decrease of inflation from 10% to 0 has the same impact as a permanent 1% reduction in productivity. So money clearly matters quantitatively. What is interesting but complicated is to say how much it matters for unemployment, since it depends on which calibration one uses. 2 Some recent attempts to bring monetary issues to bear on search-based labor-market models include Farmer (2005) , Blanchard and Gali (2005) , and Gertler and Trigari (2006) , but they all take a very different tact by assuming nominal rigidities. Our model does not need stickiness to generate interesting feedback from money to real variables. Moreover, we are more interested in intermediate-to long-run phenomena, at which frequency we find wage or price stickiness less compelling. Lehmann (2006) , Lehmann and van der Linden (2006) , and Kumar (2006) are recent attempts more in line with our approach, although the details are quite different. Rocheteau, Rupert and Wright (2006) integrate modern monetary theory into an alternative model of unemployment - Rogerson's (1988) indivisible labor model; there are reasons to prefer the Mortensen-Pissarides framework. Earlier Cooley and Hansen (1989) stuck a cash-in-advance constraint in Rogerson, as Andofatto et al. (2003) did to Mortensen and Pissarides. Something much like a standard cash-in-advance model emerges as a special case of our framework, but we think it is useful to consider the more general case, which allows trading frictions and non-competitive pricing.
The Basic Model
Time is discrete and continues forever. Each period, there are three distinct markets where economic activity takes place: a labor market, in the spirit of Mortensen-Pissarides; a goods market, in the spirit of Kiyotaki-Wright; and a general market, in the spirit of Arrow-Debreu. For brevity we call these the MP, KW and AD markets. While it does not especially matter if they meet sequentially, simultaneously, or in some combination, for concreteness let us say they meet sequentially.
3 There are two basic configurations: after any meeting of the MP market, we can convene either the KW or AD market. Since it actually does not matter for any interesting results, we arbitrarily choose the configuration shown in Figure 1 . Also, without loss of generality, we assume that agents discount at rate β between one AD market and the next MP market, and not between the other markets.
and Settings/rwright/Desktop/My Pictures/BMW-0.bmp There are two types of private agents, plus government. What one calls them depends on which market (or which literature) one looks at; e.g. they could be called firms and workers in the MP market, or buyers and sellers in the KW market. We call them firms and households, and index them by f and h. The set of households is [0, 1]; the set of potential firms has arbitrarily large measure,
although not all will be active at any point in time. Households work, consume and enjoy utility; firms maximize profit and pay out dividends to households.
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As in the standard MP model, a household and a firm can combine to create a job that produces output y. Let e index employment status: e = 1 indicates that a household (firm) is matched with a firm (household); e = 0 indicates otherwise.
As seen in Figure 1 , we introduce three value functions for the three markets,
e and W i e , which generally depend on type i ∈ {h, f }, employment status e ∈ {0, 1}, and possibly other state variables as specified below; noteÛ i f in the figure is the MP value function next period (in our notation,â is the value of any variable a next period).
Households
Let us analyze one round of three markets, starting with AD. Household h with money holdings m chooses a vector of consumption goods x and money for next periodm, to solve
where Υ e is instantaneous utility conditional on e, p is the price vector,x is the endowment vector, w n is the (nominal) wage, b n is unemployment income, ∆ is dividend income, T is a lump sum tax, and τ is a wage tax. We assume quasi-linear utility: Υ e (x) = x +Υ(x) is linear in x, wherex is a vector of goods other than x. Although this is not necessary for the theory as long as one is willing to proceed numerically, quasi-linear utility allows us to make a lot of progress analytically. As a benchmark, we often assumeΥ e (x) = 0 (i.e. a single consumption good traded in the AD market).
It is useful to provide a few results about the AD market before specifying the rest of the model. First, substitute x from the budget equation into the objective function in (1) and rearrange to write
where p is the price of x,p is the price vector for other goods, and nominal income given e is I e ≡ px + ew
linear: ∂W h e /∂m = 1/p. Moreover, the choice ofm is independent of m and I e , although in general it depends on employment status e. However, if the KW utility function introduced below is independent of e, as we assume in the benchmark model, then the derivative ofÛ h e (m) is independent of e and hence so ism (see below). Therefore all households exit the AD market and with the samem.
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We now move back to the KW market, where a commodity q different from those in the AD market is sold by firms to households. We assume that households are anonymous in this market, as is standard in monetary theory, in order to generate an essential role for a medium of exchange. See Kocherlakota (1997) , Wallace (2001) , Corbae et al. (2003) , or Aliprantis et al. (2006) for formal discussions of anonymity and essentiality, but to convey the basic idea, suppose firms cannot identify households by name. Then any h that asks f for q now, and promises to pay later (in the next AD market, say), he can renege without fear of repercussions. Hence, f must insist on quid pro quo. If we assume consumption goods are not storable by households, then fiat money will step into the role of medium of exchange.
6 5 This assumes a uniquem solves (2), which we can check, and an interior solution for x, which can be guaranteed e.g. by assuming the endowmentx is big. Analogous results (the AD value function is linear in m and all households choose the samem) hold in Lagos-Wright (2005) , and are precisely what make the framework tractable. The analysis would be a little harder, but not much, if the KW utility funciton and hencem e depended on e -it would generate a two-point distribution of money across h -but we did not think this was worth the complication. If we dispense with quasi-linearity or free access to an AD market, as in Molico (2006) or Chiu and Molico (2006) , the problem really is a lot harder and one can only proceed by numerical methods. 6 Modern monetary theory goes into much detail about specialization and other features of For h with m dollars and employment status e in the KW market,
where υ(q) is utility, α h is the probability of trade, and q and d are the quantity and dollars exchanged, as determined below. The probability of trade is given by a matching function α h = M(B, S)/B, where B and S are the measures of buyers and sellers in the market. Assuming M satisfies the usual assumptions, including constant returns, α h = M(Q, 1)/Q, where Q = B/S is the queue length or market tightness. All households participate in the KW market, so B = 1; only firms with e = 1 participate, so S = 1−u where u is unemployment.
Thus, α h = M(1, 1 − u). This exact relation depends on details, but the very general idea this: it is better to be a buyer when there are more sellers, and more sellers means less unemployment. One reason it is better to be a buyer when there are more sellers is that the probability of trade is higher, but even if this were not the case, the terms of trade can be better (more on this in Section 4.3).
For h in the MP market,
where δ is the exogenous rate at which matches are destroyed, and λ h the endogenous rate at which they are created. The latter is determined by another standard matching function, λ h = N (u, v)/u, where u is unemployment and v is the environment that give rise to a role for a medium of exchange; we see no need to repeat all of that here. We do need to say something about why money is the medium of exchange, and not e.g. claims to real assets, like shares in firms. This can be addressed formally as in Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2006) by assuming agents may not recognize counterfeit claims in the KW market, even if they can be authenticated in the AD market, while currency cannot be counterfeited (or it can always be recognized). The model still works if we allow credit in the KW market, or allow real claims to circulate, although the implications for monetary policy may be a little different; actually, the case with credit or real claims circulating can be interretted as a special case of the baseline model when we run the Friedman rule, since this makes cash and credit prefect substitutes.
the number of vacancies posted by firms. By constant returns,
where v/u is labor market tightness. We assume wages are determined when firms and households meet in the MP market (see below), although they are not actually paid until the next AD market. This is not especially important, but it avoids having to specify how w is paid -e.g. in dollars or in goods -since all that matters in AD is the implied purchasing power.
This completes the specification of the household problem. Before moving to firms, we mention that one can collapse the three value functions for h into one Bellman equation. Substituting (3) into (4) we get 
where expectation E is with respect to next period's employment statusê. As shown below -see e.g. condition (12) -the terms of trade (q,d) depend onm but not e, I e or m, so (6) makes clear thatm is independent of e, I e and m.
Firms
First, since firms do not need money in the KW market, they obviously choosê m = 0. Then, in the MP market, Hence there is a role for a separate goods market, or retail sector, which is our KW market.
Firm f participates in the goods market iff he produced that period, which requires e = 1. If f with output y makes sells q in the KW market, we assume that y − q is transformed into x = ζ(y − q) units of the quasi-linear good in the next AD market, where ζ 0 > 0 and ζ 00 ≤ 0 (there is implicitly a nonnegativity constraint on inventories, q ≤ y, but it is easy to give conditions guaranteeing that this is not binding). It is useful to define the opportunity cost of a sale as c(q) = ζ(y) − ζ(y − q), which satisfies c 0 > 0 and c 00 ≥ 0. Unless otherwise specified, we assume ζ is linear. Then we can write x = y − q, without loss in generality, and c(q) = q. This means one could interpret x and q as the same physical good that f can store across markets, bearing in mind that consumers generally value it differently in the two markets.
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For convenience we consolidate production and retail activities within the same firm (although it might be interesting to proceed differently). Thus, for f with e = 1 in the KW market,
where α f = M(B, S)/S, and W f 1 (x, m) is the value of entering the AD market with x units of the quasi-linear good in inventory and m in cash receipts. That is,
where w = w n /p is the real wage, which as we said is paid in AD. Combing these expressions,
where
is expected real revenue.
As in the standard model, a firm with e = 0 has no current revenue or wage obligations, but if it pays a real cost k in the current AD market, it enters the next MP market with a vacancy that might match with a worker. Thus, 
, which by (9) can be written
Average real profit across all firms is (1 − u)(R − w) − vk. As we said, our firms pay out profits as dividends to households. If we assume the representative household holds the representative portfolio, their real dividend is
Government
Government consumes G in real terms, levies lump sum and proportional wage taxes T and τ , and prints money at rate π so thatM = (1 + π)M . It also pays out a real UI (unemployment insurance) benefit b, which is taxed, to households with e = 0. Hence, the nominal value of unemployment income in (1) is b n = pb(1 − τ ) + p , where is the real value of leisure plus home production, which is not taxed. The government budget constraint is pG+pbu = T +τw n (1−u)+πM.
We can describe monetary policy in terms of setting the nominal interest rate i, or equivalently in terms of the growth rate of the money supply π, because of the Fisher equation 1 + i = (1 + π)/β. We always assume i > 0, although we do consider the limit as i → 0, which is the Friedman rule.
Equilibrium
Various assumptions can be made concerning price determination in the different markets, including (Walrasian) price taking, bargaining, and price posting with or without directed search. We think the most reasonable scenario is the following: price taking in the AD market, bargaining in the MP market, and posting with directed search in the KW market. We like price taking in the AD market because it is simple, and in any case the AD market is not the prime focus of our analysis. In the MP market, which is a key part of the theory, we opt for bargaining because it seems realistic for many labor markets and because it is standard in the related literature. The choice is less clear for the KW market, so we consider several options. We actually start here with bargaining version because it is slightly easier to present. In the next section we present a Walrasian price-taking version, which might feel more comfortable to mainstream macroeconomists, and our most preferred option, price posting with directed search in this market.
Price posting with directed search -also known as competitive search equilibrium, after Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) -is our preferred approach for several reasons. First, it is fairly convenient after some initial set-up cost. Second, directed search should seem like a big step forward to those like Howitt (2005) who criticize monetary theory with random matching for the assumption of randomness per se. 8 It should also appease those like Phelan (2005) , who don't like much modern monetary theory because they "don't like bargaining."
More seriously, bargaining models typically need an unpalatable assumption that agents see each others' money holdings to avoid the technical difficulties of bargaining with private information. Finally, using competitive search eliminates bargaining power as a free parameter. Hence, competitive search deflects several critiques, is convenient, and seems realistic.
Whatever the pricing mechanism, we break the analysis of equilibrium into three parts. First, following Lagos-Wright (2005), we determine the value of money as measured by q, taking unemployment u as given. We then determine u, taking q as given, as in Mortensen-Pissarides (1996) . It is convenient to depict these two relationships graphically in (u, q) space by what we call the LW curve and the MP curve. Their intersection determines the equilibrium unemployment rate and value of money (u, q), from which all of the other endogenous variables easily follow.
The LW Curve
Imagine for now f and h meet and bargain bilaterally over (q, d) in the KW market, st d ≤ m, where m is money held by h. Because it is easy, we use the generalized Nash solution, with threat points equal to continuation values from not trading and θ denoting the buyer's bargaining power. 9 The surplus for h is (2005):
As we said above, in this paper we usually assume c(q) = q, which simplifies (12) a little. Now recall (6), which in terms of the choicem is summarized by
where we insertedd =m and it is understood thatq is a function ofm, given implicitly by (12) . By the Fisher equation
The first order condition for an interior solution is υ 0 (q)∂q/∂m = (i +α h ) /α hp (second order conditions are discussed below). Inserting ∂q/∂m = 1/pg 1 (q, θ), which we get by differentiating (12), as well asα h = M(1, 1 −û), and then imposing steady state, we arrive at
This is the LW curve, determining q for a given u exactly as in Lagos and Wright (2005) . An increase in u affects q because, as discussed above, higher unemployment makes it less attractive to be a buyer by adversely affecting the probability and/or terms of trade. This reduces the demand for m/p and hence reduces q via the bargaining solution m/p = g(q, θ). From known results we can describe the properties of the LW curve. First, it is not automatic that the LHS 10 Basically, d = m follows from a simple arbitrage argument -why bring more money than you are ever going to spend? -and (12) follows directly from the first order condition.
of (14) is decreasing in q, but one can impose conditions to guarantee it is, and hence to guarantee a unique q > 0 solving this condition for any u ∈ (0, 1) with ∂q/∂u < 0.
11 But even if υ 0 /g 1 is not globally decreasing, it is decreasing at any q such that the second-order condition is satisfied; hence, whenever the firstand second-order conditions hold ∂q/∂u < 0. Also, letting q * be the efficient quantity, given by υ 0 (q * ) = 1, q is bounded by q * for any u. Also, u = 1 implies q = 0. Summarizing:
Proposition 1 For all i > 0 the LW curve slopes downward in (u, q) space, with u = 0 implying q ∈ (0, q * ) and u = 1 implying q = 0. It shifts down with i and up with θ. In the limit as i → 0, q → q 0 for all u < 1, where q 0 is independent of u, and q 0 ≤ q * with q 0 < q * unless θ = 1.
The MP Curve
When unmatched f and h meet in the labor market, they bargain over w according to the generalized Nash solution with threat points equal to continuation values from remaining unmatched and η the bargaining power of f . The surplus
e from (6) and simplifying, (7) and free entry. One solves this problem in the standard way: (i) first maximize the Nash product taking as given future surplusesŜ i ; (ii) then insert the steady state values
and rearrange for
where z = b + /(1 − τ ) is the value to h of not working, adjusting for taxes.
If we substitute w from (15) and R from (10) into the free entry condition (11), we arrive at
where r = 1/β − 1. To reduce this to one equation in (u, q) we do three things:
(i) insert the arrival rates from the matching functions
from the bargaining solution; and (iii) use the so-called Beveridge curve (the steady state condition for unemployment) (1 − u)δ = N (u, v) to solve for and
This is the MP curve, determining u as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1996) , except that they effectively have q = 0. It is a matter of routine calculation to show that this curve is downward sloping. Intuitively, there are three effects from an increase in u, two from the usual MP model and one that is new, all of which encourage entry: (i) it is easier for firms to hire; (ii) it is harder for households to get hired, which lowers w; (iii) it is easier for firms to compete in the KW market, which is the new effect. Again, these three effects go in the same direction and the MP curve unambiguously slopes downward. It is easy to derive other properties of the MP curve. Summarizing:
Proposition 2 The MP curve slopes downward in (u, q) space. It shifts in with y, η or θ, and out with k, r, δ or z = b + /(1 − τ ).
LW meets MP
Propositions 1 and 2 imply both LW and MP slope downward in the box B = Figure ? ?. LW enters B from the upper left when u = 0 at q 0 ≤ q * , and exits at (0, 0). MP enters B when q = q * at some u > 0, with u < 1 iff k is not too big, and exits B by either hitting the horizontal axis at some u 0 ∈ (0, 1), or hitting the vertical axis at some q 1 ∈ (0, q * ). It is easy to check MP hits the horizontal axis u 0 ∈ (0, 1), as shown by the curve We also know that a sufficient condition for a steady state with u < 1, and hence for a monetary steady state, is η (y − z) > k(r + δ), which is also required for a steady state with u < 1 in the standard MP model. Given (u, q), we can recover all of the other endogenous variables, including vacancies v, the arrival rates α j and λ j , real balances m/p = g(q, θ), and the nominal price level p = M/g(q, θ).
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A convenient result from Propositions 1 and 2 is that changes in i shift only the LW curve, while changes in y, η, r, k, δ or z shift only the MP curve. This 12 Given these variables, the AD budget equation yields x for every individual as a function of the m with which he enters. In the general case where there is a vectorx of other AD goods, maximization determines an individual demand as a function of employment status andp (plus p which has already been determined). Write this asx = De(p). Market demand is D(p) = uD 0 (p) + (1 − u)D 1 (p). Equating this to the endowment vector yields a standard system of general equilibrium equations D(p) =x that solve forp. The model displays classical neutrality: if we change M, we can change p andp proportionally without affecting the AD equilibrium conditions or the values of the other real variables (q, u, v). This does not mean money does not matters: a change in i (or equivalently π) shifts the LW curve, which affects q, u and the rest of the system. When AD utility Υ does not depend on e, however, neither does demand, so D(p) is independent of u and hencex is independent of monetary policy -a version of the neoclassical dichotomy.
makes it easy to analyze changes in parameters. For example, an increase in the nominal interest rate i shifts the LW curve toward the origin, reducing q and u if equilibrium is unique (or, in the 'natural' equilibria if we do not have uniqueness). The result ∂q/∂i < 0 holds in the standard LW model, with a fixed α h , but now there is a general equilibrium (multiplier) effect via u that reduces α h and further reduces q. Similarly, an increase in z shifts the MP curve out, increasing u and reducing q if equilibrium is unique (or, in the 'natural' equilibria). The result in ∂u/∂z > 0 u holds in the standard MP model with fixed R, but now there is an effect via q that reduces R and further increases u.
Other experiments can be analyzed similarly.
Proposition 3 Steady state equilibrium always exist. One steady state is a nonmonetary equilibrium, which has u < 1 iff η (y − z) > k(r + δ). If this inequality holds, there also exists a monetary steady state. Assuming the monetary steady state is unique, a rise in i decreases q and increases u, while a rise in y or η, or a fall in k, r, δ or z, increases q and decreases u.
Alternative Pricing Mechanisms
While the model works fine with random matching and bargaining, we want to consider some alternatives, as discussed above. We first consider competitive search equilibrium, which involves price posting and directed search, and then competitive equilibrium, with Walrasian price-taking behavior.
Price Posting
There are several ways to formalize the notion of competitive search equilibrium.
One is to have sellers first post the terms of trade, then have buyers direct their search to the most favorable sellers, taking into account that they may not get served if more buyers show up than a seller has capacity to handle. Or we can have buyers post the terms of trade to attract sellers. Or we can imagine market makers that set up submarkets and try to attract buyers and sellers by posting the terms of trade, so they can charge them an entrance fee (which is 0 in equilibrium), where in each submarket buyers and sellers match randomly according to M(B, S) but are bound by the posted terms. It is known in the literature than these different stories all lead to the same set of equilibrium conditions.
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Given this, we proceed by assuming sellers post the terms of trade, but trade is still probabilistic, in the sense that if a group of B buyers direct their search towards a group of S sellers, the number of meetings is given by M(B, S).
Hence, agents need to know the queue length Q = B/S to determine the relevant probabilities, α f = M(Q, 1) and α h = M(Q, 1)/Q. We imagine the firm posting in the AD market the following message: "If I have anything to sell (i.e. if e = 1) next period, then I commit to sell q units for d dollars in the KW market, but I can serve at most one customer, and you should expect a queue length Q."
Formally, the problem of a firm is
whereẐ is the terms offered by the best alternative seller.
14 13 Papers that model different versions of these stories, in addition to Moen (1997) and Shimmer (1996) , include Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) , Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) , Mortensen and Wright (2002) , and Julien, Kennes and King (2000) . There is one detail. While these different models are equivalent in nonmonetary economies, Faig and Huangfu (2005) show that a monetary economy can do better with market makers than with sellers or buyers posting. The idea is that market makers can in principle charge buyers and pay sellers (i.e. charge them a negative fee) to enter their submaket, and then have them trade if they meet at price 0. Effectively, this insures agents against the possibility of not trading and allows buyers to each bring less money. However, one can assume market makers cannot tell if an agent is a buyer or a seller, which precludes differential fees and recovers the equivalence.
14 The objective function is expected revenue net of opportunity cost, ignoring constants that do not affect the maximization, and the constraint says the seller has to offer buyers at leastẐ, since this problem is conditional on wanting some buyers to actually show up. It is easy to derive this simplified version of a firm's problem from the underlying dynamic model. Assume for now thatẐ ∈ (0,Z) whereZ is not too big (see below), so that the firm wants some buyers to show up, Q > 0. Then use the constraint to eliminate d and rewrite (17) as
One can show this problem has a solution with Q > 0. Indeed, over the interval To indicate where this is leading, think of Q as the demand for buyers by a seller, andẐ as the price (in terms of utility) that the seller has to pay in order to get buyers to show up. In equilibriumẐ will be determined so that 15 Indeed, we will give sufficient conditions for Q to be single-valued, and strictly decreasing. When Q(Ẑ) is not convex valued, as is the case in the Figure when Z = Z 2 , we need to have different sellers posting different Q's to clear the market. This is not a big deal, but the situation is obviously simpler when Q(Ẑ) is convex valued. the supply of buyers per firm 1/(1 − u) equals the demand Q as long asẐ > 0; ifẐ = 0 then buyers get no surplus in the KW market, and any given buyer is indifferent whether or not he shows up, so we can get any number B ∈ [0, 1].
Let Q 0 = Q(0) and define u 0 by Q 0 = 1/(1 − u 0 ). Then as long as u < u 0 , there is a Z > 0 such that the market clears with Q(Z) = 1/(1 − u). When u ≥ u 0 , the market equilibrates at Z = 0, in which case B < 1 buyers show up and the rest stay home, so that Q = Q 0 < 1/(1 − u). Clearly, the market clears at Z > 0 iff u is not too big. Hence, in equilibrium Q = Q(u) = min {Q 0 , 1/(1 − u)}.
Given this, take the first order conditions to (17):
From (19) we determine q by:
Now eliminate from (17) M + iQ using (19) andẐ using the constraint, to
Letting ε(Q) ≡ QM 1 (Q, 1)/M(Q, 1) be the elasticity of M with respect to B,
where g(·) is defined in (12). Hence, as is well-known in this literature, posting and bargaining give similar solutions, except bargaining power θ is replaced by the elasticity ε(Q).
Let us collect some results. First, substitute (22) into the constraint in (17) and use (19) to write
Then rewrite (19) as
Given Z, (q, Q) solves the first order conditions iff it solves (23)-(24). This is a candidate solution to (18), but we need to check the second order conditions.
To this end we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1:
Assumption 2:
is the term in braces in (23). A sufficient condition for (25) is that ε(Q) is not too small; (26) holds for all the standard matching functions used in the literature.
Given (25)- (26), the locus of points in (Q, q) space satisfying (23) or q = 0 yields payoff 0. It is easy to check that, at least for i and Z not too big, a non-zero solution (Q, q) does exist. It is also easy to check that ∂Q/∂Z < 0 under (25)-(26). All of this implies we can rule out the complications shown in Figure 2 , and the situation is as in Figure 3 .
So under assumptions (25)- (26), there is a unique solution (q, Q) and it is non-zero iff Z <Z. Given an unemployment rate u < u 0 , we have Q = 1/(1−u), and q is pinned down by (19). If we increase u, as Figure 3 shows, we reduce Z, which reduces q, as one can check by differentiating (23)- (24). This traces out a downward-sloping locus of points in (u, q) space. Intuitively, as u increases the KW queue length Q increases, reducing α h and q. The only complication is that when we increase u beyond u 0 , there is no Z > 0 that equates Q(Z) = 1/(1−u), so in equilibrium Q = Q 0 and households get Z = 0 in the KW market. For and Settings/rwright/Desktop/Docs/graphics/BMW-3.bmp The MP curve also needs to be modified, as follows. For u < u 0 we have
which is identical to (16), except that we replace bargaining power θ with the elasticity ε = ε(Q) = ε( 
Walrasian Price Taking
We now consider Walrasian price taking in the KW market. Search models with price taking go back to the Lucas and Prescott (1974) model of unemployment, where although it may take time to get from one local labor market to another, each one is composed of large numbers of workers and firms who behave perfectly competitively. This idea is similar in the KW market here, except a medium of exchange is essential for the usual reasons -a double coincidence problem and anonimity. Agents take the dollar price φ of KW goods parametrically. Also, as in Rocheteau and Wright (2005) , we generalize Lucas-Prescott by allowing for frictions in the sense that agents get into the market only probabilistically.
We also allow a potentially nonlinear opportunity cost c(q) in the KW market to illustrate certain points.
Every f with e = 1 wants to get into the KW market. Those that do choose
Then in the AD market, with the usual MP manipulations, free entry implies
where α f is the probability f gets into the KW market. Every h wants to get into the KW market, and those that do choose q h to maximize υ(q
st φq h ≤ m, and in equilibrium as usual we get q h = m/φ. In the AD market, h
, whereα h is the probability h gets into the KW market. Since Walrasian pricing implies ∂q h /∂m = 1/φ, and φ = pc
from the firm problem, the usual LW manipulations yield
Search-type frictions are introduced by letting the measures of h and f that get in to the KW market be a function of the measures that want to get in,
is necessary in models of bilateral trade but obviously not in Walrasian models.
If we do assume M h = M f , however, we can always interpret agents as trading bilaterally even though they take prices parametrically. Another special case is the frictionless version of the model where everyone who wants to can trade,
we cannot possibly have this in a model with bilateral trade unless u = 0. In any case, the goods market clearing (29) and (28) gives us the LW and MP curves with Walrasian pricing in the KW market.
In the special case with no frictions, α h = 1 and α f = 1, we have q f = q/(1 − u). In this special case the LW and MP curves become
If we additionally impose linear cost, c(q) = q, then something moderately spectacular occurs: u vanishes from LW and q vanishes from MP. That is, the LW curve is horizontal and the MP curve vertical in (u, q) space, so the model dichotmozies. Intutively, with linear cost profit is 0 in a Walrasian market, which means that any surplus generated by KW trade goes to households, and therefore firm entry decisions and employment are independent of q. The MP cure is vertical. Also, since all households get into the goods market and the price (equals marginal cost) is independent of the number of firms when c(q) is linear, the value of money does not depend on u. The LW curve is horizontal.
This dichotomy arises in the special case where (i) there are no fricitons and
(ii) cost is linear. Actually, while both of these conditions are needed to solve LW for q independently of u, only the latter is needed to solve MP independently of q. Based on this insight, one can reinterpret the standard MP model as one where firms do indeed sell their output in a market to households other than their own employees (for cash or credit, it is irrelevant in this case), since as long as the cost of sales in this market is linear and pricing is Walrasian, households get all and firms get none of the gains from trade, and u is determined as in the textbook model. There may or may not be monetary exchaneg lurking behind the labor market scene, but it does not affect vacancy creation or unemployment.
of course we could also get the standard MP model as a special case in the bargaining model, say, but giving buyers all the bargaining power θ = 1.
One might say that when α h = α f = 1 the model "looks like" a standard cash-in-advance economy, since there are no search-type frictions and no noncompetitive pricing issues. We think it is good to allow for the possibility of frictions and alternative pricing mechanisms. We also firmly believe it is better
to have a deeper model of monetary exchange -to be explicit and logically consistent about things like the double coincidence problem and role of anonimity -rather than to cavalierly impose cash-in-advance (this is not the place to discuss the issue in detail, but we do want to mention that the explicit and logically consistent model is no harder to solve). If however the reader is firmly committed to shallow models of money, we offer this frictionless version of our model with Walrasian pricing, which is equivalent (in terms of algebra) to cashin-advance model, and still has LW and MP curves like the benchmark model (as long as we do not have linear cost).
Efficiency
Consider a planner who seeks to maximize the welfare (expected utility) of the representative household, subject to several constraints. First, output y is produced in employment relations that form in the first subperiod, subject to the law of motion for u. Second, if firms and households meet in the second subperiod, which occurs according to the technology M (·), the former can transfer q to the latter for a payoff of υ(q), and bring the remainder to the third subperiod, where it can be allocated to any household for a payoff of y − q.
Each period, the planner takes unemployment u as a state variable, and chooses how many vacancies v to post, as well as q. He also chooses how to allocate remaining output in the third subperiod, but with quasi-linear utility this does not effect average welfare, and in paticular UI payments b do not show up in the planner's calculations.
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To reduce the notation, let s (q) ≡ υ (q) − q be the surplus from a KW trade. Then after simplification the planner's problem reduces to the following dynamic program:
Instantaneous utility subtracts vacancy costs from output, including the output of the unemployed and the employed, plus the suplus generated by meetings in the KW market. It is not hard to show this is a well-behaved problem, and J is concave. The FOC for q is s 0 (q) = 0, which implies q = q * at every date. The
This together with the law of motion
determining the path for (u, v).
The envelope condition is
Using the FOC for v to eliminate J 0 , we get the Euler equation
In steady state, the planner's solution generates unemployment u * satisfying
where we inserted v = v(u), which we get from the Beveridge curve
17 16 To ease the presentation we assume there are no goodsx in the third subperiod other than x; if there were, the allocation would satisfy the obvious additional marginal conditions. 17 Dynamics are more intricate than in the standard LW model, because here u is a state variable, and more intricate than in the standard MP model, where v/u is independent of u, because here u enters M (1, 1 − u) (these observations are true for both the planner's problem and for equilibrium). We focus on steady states for now, relegating dynamic analysis to a companion paper.
We want to compare this outcome to the steady state of the competitive search equilibrium model (one could do something similar assuming other KW pricing mechanisms, including bargaining, but as is well known bargaining can generate its own inefficiencies). To facilitate the comparison, rewrite the MP curve (27) after inserting the elasticity σ ≡ vN 2 /N , which generally depends on u and v, and
We also assume for now that u < u 0 (we are to the left of the kink), which will certainly be true for small i. Also, we only consider the limiting case where
From the LW curve, q = q * iff i = 0. Then, given q * , a comparison of (30) and (31) with r ≈ 0 implies (after some algebra) that u = u * iff
Any combination of b and τ that makes b + τ 1−τ equal to the RHS of (32) makes the planner's solution and equilibrium coincide. If η = σ (the Hosios 1990 condition), then u = u * iff b + τ 1−τ = 0, which certainly holds in laissezfaire equilibrium, b = τ = 0. If η > σ, then we need to set b + τ 1−τ = 0 > 0, which means either market activity should be taxed or unemployment subsidized; and if η < σ, then we need to set b + τ 1−τ = 0 < 0, which means either market activity should be subsidized or unemployment taxed. Hence, if policy is unconstrained, we can always achieve efficiency by running the Friedman rule to get q * and setting labor market policy to get u * .
Suppose there is a restriction, for whatever reason, that b + τ 1−τ is strictly less than the RHS of (32). Then we claim monetary policy should compensate with i > 0. To verify this, note that if i > 0 is small the LW curve implies only a second order welfare loss by the envelope theorem, while the MP curve implies a first order gain since s(q) εs 0 (q)+1−ε is strictly increasing at q = q * . Hence, if labor market policy is constrained so that b or τ are too low, monetary policy should compensate with inflation above the Friedman rule. The intuition is clear: given η > σ, e.g., there is too much entry in laissez-faire, and if we are restricted in directly taxing market activity or subsidizing unempolyment, the next best is to inflate and tax market activity indirectly. This generates a welfare gain in terms of u and loss in terms of q, but the net gain is unambiguouly positive.
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Proposition 4 Given no constraints on policy, the optimum is to set i = 0
and set b + τ 1−τ to equal the RHS of (32), which takes the same sign as η − σ. Given b + τ 1−τ is too low, the optimal constrained policy is i > 0, which means inflation above the Friedman rule.
6 Quantitative Analysis
Some Observations
A first-order prediction of the theory in this paper is that inflation increases unemployment, because inflation is a tax on cash-intensive activty, including the goods market, which reduces profit, vacancy creation, and employment.
Our priors were that this would be a problem empirically, since the conventional wisdom is that inflation and unemployment are if anything negatively related; our thinking was that one would need to be somewhat clever to twist the theory to fit the stylized facts. Before getting carried away with twisting, however, the first thing to do is to check the data. is constrained to be too high, the same logic might suggest we should set i < 0 -except that i < 0 is not consistent with equilibrium. One can also ask how labor market policy should respond in the second best scenario when i is constrained to be above the Friedman rule. Intuition and examples indicate that we should set b + τ 1−τ < 0 -i.e. subsidize market activity or tax unemployment directly to increase profit and encourage entry -but this is hard to prove in general because the envelope theorem does not apply (with i = 0 we get q = q * for any b + and the nominal rate (these are Aaa Corporate Bond rates; the chart is similar using T-Bill rates). There is a clear negative relation, depsite the well-known problem that from the early 1980s to the late 1990s interest rates dropped and money demand did not increase -i.e. there seems to have been a structural shift. This is something we will not model here, although at an informal level it may not be hard to understand given innovations in transactions technologies. The question we ask is, how does our model account for the low-frequency dynamics in inflation and unemployment, given we try to also match money and interest rates?
and Settings/rwright/Desktop/Docs/JDPXYT0D.wmf Money and Interest, High-Frequency Filtered, 1901 -2001 
Parameters and targets
We choose a quarter as the model period, and take 1959-2005 as the sample to be studied. We need to calibrate: (i) preferences as described by β, and υ(q);
(ii) technology as described by y, δ, k, N (u, v) andM(B, S)}, although we can normalize y = 1; (iii) bargaining power η and θ (the latter is relevant only if we assume bargaining in the KW market); and (iv) policy τ , i and b. Following most of the macro literature, we assume υ(q) = Aq 1−α /(1−α). Following most of the labor literature, we take the MP matching function to be N (u, v) = Zu 1−σ v σ , and normalize Z = 1 without loss in generality (it merely determines the units in which we measure vacancies). We take the KW matching function to be M(B, S) = B(1 − e −S/B ), the so-called urn-ball matching technolgy, which is a parsimonious specification, and one that can be derived endogenously with by price posting and directed search.
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There are 11 parameters to calibrate, some of which are relatively "obvious."
We take an average annual nominal interest rate on Aaa corporate bonds is i = 0.072, and an average CPI inflation rate of π = 0.037, which implies a real rate of r = 0.035, and hence β = 0.966 per year. We use the average effective marginal labor tax rate measured by McGrattan et al. (1997) , τ = 0.242.
We target a UI replacement rate of b/w = 0.5, consistent with Shimer (2005) .
Also following Shimer (2005), we set the elasticity of N wrt v to the regression coefficient of the job-finding probability on labor market tightness, σ = 0.72, and set the job-destruction rate to δ = 0.051 to match an average unemployment rate of u = 0.059. 21 Table 1 shows the values for all of these "obvious" parameters, and five others to be determined, as we now discuss.
First, as is well known, the values of leisure and firm bargaining power η are hard to calibrate. Shimer (2005) somewhat arbitrarily sets = 0 and η = σ (as we saw in the previous section, the latter choice guarantees efficiency under laissez-faire in the basic MP model). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006) alternatively identify and η using evidence on recruitment costs and wage volatility over the business cycle, which in their benchmark model implies z = b+ /(1−τ ) = 0.955 and η = 0.94. To say these alternative calibration strategies are controversial is an understatement; we remain agnostic and report findings for both. Then we set the remaining preference parameters A and α to match 20 Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) e.g. consider a market with finite numbers of sellers and buyers, where the former first post prices and the latter then decide where to go knowing that each seller can only serve one buyer. The "natural" equilibrium has all sellers post the same price and buyers select one at random, making the number of matches (buyers who get served) a random variable. As the numbers of buyers and sellers increases holding the ratio fixed, the number of matches converges to specification in the text. 21 Shimer estimates an average monthly job-finding rate of λ h = 0.45, which implies a monthly job-destruction rate of δ = 0.028, given u. At quarterly frequencies these estimates imply average money demand (or velocity) and its interest elasticity, which in our data are 0.169 and −0.3.
22 However, since the results are somewhat sensitive to the elasticity, for good economic reasons, and estimates are sensitive to e.g.
how one treats the apparent structural shift in money demand, we also consider −0.5 and −0.8. Finally, using the free entry condition, we set k to match the average job-finding rate λ h , since λ h pins down market tightness and hence the expected duration of a vacancy. Table 1 reports the calibrated parameter values when we use η = 1/2 and two alternative values of leisure. In the "Shimer" calibration, we set = 0, which implies a ratio ρ = z/w between the household's value of non-market and market activities of 0.5, as in Shimer (2005) . In the "HM" calibration, we set = 0.386, which implies ρ = 0.998, as in Hagedorn-Manovskii (2006) . The value η = 1/2 is somewhat arbitrary, but it turns out not to matter -a change in η modifies k, but does not affect any interesting results. First, it seems that the model matches the standard money demand observations about as well as one could hope, given the structural shift in the latter part of the sample mentioned above. And, second, there is little to distinguish between the "Shimer" and "HM" calibrations based on these observations. the "HM" calibration, the model is quantitatively quite close to the data: as π goes from 1% to 10%, u increases from around 5% to around 9%, roughly the same as in the data. The difference between the two versions is easy to understand. Under the "HM" calibration, the flow value of non-market activity is nearly twice as high as under the "Shimer" calibration. In turn, equilibrium wages are higher and profits lower. Therefore, in the "HM" calibration, an increase in inflation implies a much larger percentage fall in profit, and hence a more pronounced drop in vacancies and ultimately employment. This is of course the very same economics that explains why the Hagedorn-Manovskii model generates realistically large, and the Shimer model generates very small, responses of u to technology shocks.
We present another view of the same results in Figure ? ?. In the model it does not matter if we specify monetary policy in terms of π or i since they are The results of comparing the data and models are the same: using the "HM" calibration we can account for much of the HP trend in unemployment in the sample by changes in monetary policy; using the "Shimer" calibration we can account for very little. To be clear, our goal is not to account for as much as possible of the pattern observed in the data -we rather ask "how much"
we can account for by monetary policy, abstracting counterfactually from other real shocks that presumably were also relevant, in the tradition of e.g. Prescott (1985) who asks how much of the business cycle we can account for by technology shocks abstracting counterfactually from other shocks. Our answer is, "it depends."
To provide further intuition for the results, Tables 2 and 3 give the elasticities of u and R − w (profit) wrt i, y, k, , τ and b/w for the "Shimer" and "HM" In table 4 , we use this number as a target to pin down = 0.379, which is quite close to the "HM" value. Recalibrating in this way, the results obviously fall somewhere in between the two benchmark calibrations. Table 4 : Elasticity wrt y targeted to −22.
One can also ask how well we do with alternative versions of the model, such as the version with bargaining in the goods market instead of posting.
The parameters in table 1a are the same, but we need to recalibrate the other parameters to match the same tragets, given any particular value of the buyer's bargaining power θ. The results can be seen in Figure 8 for θ = 0.5, which shows that even under the "HM" calibration we account for less of the changes in u based on changes in π. This, however, depends on θ. The case with θ = 2/3 is shown in Figure 9 . The basic message is similar -how much we can account for depends on which calibration strategy we adopt -but with bargaining there is an additional free parameter that also matters.
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Welfare Cost of Inflation
To be added.
Conclusions
